Research

My research interests are in algorithmic game theory and mechanism design, bounded rationality, and computational complexity. I have also recently become interested in quantum computation and Bernoulli factories. My PhD thesis was on designing mechanisms for imperfectly rational agents that are not obviously manipulable, and broadly sits in the literature on bounded rationality mechanism design.

Publications

Willy Wonka Mechanisms
- Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
- AAMAS 2024, arxiv
Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: the Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents
- Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
- IJCAI 2023
Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade
- Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
- ACM TEAC, AAMAS 2023, arxiv

Working Papers

Mechanism design with predictions, quantum information elicitation, Bernoulli factories!

Teaching

At King’s I taught the following modules:

6CCS3AIN Artificial Intelligence Reasoning and Decision Making (2022/23-24)
- sequential decision making, Markov Decision Processes, etc.
6CCS3OME Optimization Methods (2020/21-24)
- single-source shortest path, all-pairs shortest path, network flow, linear programming, optimisation techniques for NP-hard problems
4CCS1DST Data Structures (2021/22-23)
- data structures and algorithms, searching, sorting
4CCS1FC1 Foundations of Computing I (2022/23)
- introductory course on mathematics for computer science
4CCE1MAP Mathematics and programming for engineers (2023/24)
5CCM251A Discrete mathematics (2023/24)
6CCE3EAL Engineering algorithms (2023/24)
6CCM359A Numerical and computational methods (2023/24)

DAI Seminar

I help to organise the fortnightly seminar for the DAI research group. We don’t have much of an online presence as it stands so I will make a note of past talks here. If you’d like to present a talk on your work at the seminar please get in touch!

16/05/2023: Vangelis Markakis (AUEB), Winner Determination and Strategic Control in Conditional Approval Voting
02/05/2023: David C. Parkes (Harvard), Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules
04/04/2023: David Mguni (Huawei), Towards the Goal of Optimally Performing Intelligent Multi-Agent Systems
21/03/2023: Buhong Liu (King’s and University of Glasgow), Agent-Based Modelling in Finance
07/03/2023: Micah Carroll (UC Berkeley), User Manipulation Incentives in Recommender Systems
21/02/2023: Kristin Blesch (University of Bremen), Conditional Feature Importance for Mixed Data
07/02/2023: Elfia Bezou-Vrakatseli (King’s), Debating Ethics: Using Natural Language Datasets to Support Human and AI Debate
24/01/2023: Xingzhou Lou (King’s), PECAN: Leveraging Policy Ensemble for Context-Aware Zero-Shot Human-AI Coordination
12/01/2023: Krzysztof R. Apt (CWI), Characterization of Incentive Compatible Single-parameter Mechanisms Revisited
08/12/2022: Sahar Jahani (LSE), Automated Equilibrium Analysis of \(\mathit{2 \times 2 \times 2}\) Games
24/11/2022: Max Bartolo (UCL), Dynamic Adversarial Data Collection for Question Answering
10/11/2022: Mark Staarink (Urbit), Urbit: the personal server
20/10/2022: Joel Z. Leibo (DeepMind), Reverse-Engineering Human Evolution with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
06/10/2022: Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi (Meta), Fair Equilibria in Sponsored Search Auctions: the Advertisers’ Perspective
05/05/2022: Dario Paccagnan (Imperial), Two birds with one stone: optimal approximation for integral routing and congestion pricing
27/01/2022: Fanghua Ye (UCL), Slot Self-Attentive and Label Noise-Robust Dialogue State Tracking